Mechanics And The Collective Unconscious
this author's previously published book Agent Human; Consciousness
At The Service Of The Group the term 'collective unconscious' was
used extensively to describe a mechanism through which a body of presumed-to-be-standard
cognitive content is available to all human brains, made up of a collection
of archetypes and associated pre-linguistic concepts that are presented
as being essential to human socialization, or, put differently, as being
an unavoidable consequence and concomitant of the process by which human
groups emerged as the bedrock of human culture and civilization.
is a highly anthropomorphic formulation, and it must be stated immediately
that there is no reason to deny a 'collective unconscious' to many other
animals that preceded humans in evolutionary terms.
those who have not read Agent Human in its entirety, Appendix One of the
current volume presents some of the key concepts underlying that book's
thesis in abbreviated form. Here it will be assumed that the reader has
taken on board the content of Agent Human, or at least has read that Appendix.
people will want to deny the entire concept of a 'collective unconscious',
preferring instead to believe that human cognitive growth results entirely
from early socialization. It is possible, just, to take this view without
postulating a 'tabula rasa', which was one of the preferred theories from
say 1850 to 1950, but had to give way before an accumulating mountain
of evidence for a genetic component to human infantile development. Nowadays,
the onus is on the deniers to account for the similarity of human ontogeny
between different cultures without admitting some common genetic thread
underpinning that development.
it is going to be assumed that there is a large degree of commonality
between the psyches of neo-natal human infants, whatever culture they
are born into, and the unresolved question that remains is whether that
commonality arises from shared patterns of organic development (a view
which we will call nativist) or, at least partially, from universal access
to an external body of cognitive content, which we (following e.g. Jung)
have chosen to label the collective unconscious (a view which we will
call collectivist). Neither hypothesis is easy to exemplify or accept.
both accounts, it is possible to distinguish between genetic and external
mechanisms. That's to say, a 'nativist' account might include a considerable
degree of evolved genetic pre-programming, together with some post-natal
influence from life experience, while a 'collectivist' account might include
some genetic pre-programming together with some pre- or post-natal input
from the collective unconscious and some post-natal external influence
from life experience.
is horribly difficult to distinguish between these possibilities based
on empirical evidence. No-one will pretend that the infants of 'higher'
species, which for now we will characterize as mammals, reptiles and amphibians,
are born without a considerable array of 'inherited' or 'instinctive'
behaviours for use in survival, mating and (perhaps less obviously) socialization.
There is ample evidence that these behaviours emerge regardless of the
amount of parenting received by the infant. Absence of parenting may be
lethal or highly damaging for an infant; but still many of the most important
behaviours are built in genetically, and operate within the limbic system.
In many of these instinctive behaviours, there is a strong endocrine causative
component, in fact many of the behaviours emerge during the immediate
post-natal period through a complex interaction of genetic, hormonal and
endocrinal factors, although the limbic system itself is almost completely
formed in the pre-natal period. There is therefore a possibility that
post-natal behaviour formation may be influenced by external olfactory,
tactile or even visual cues.
basic mechanisms as hunger and thirst, which are a crucial part of survival,
are well understood, neurologically speaking, and operate in a similar
way across a wide range of species (see e.g. Perry, Society
for Neuroscience). Many of these instinctive behaviours have been
allocated to particular regions of the brain (see e.g. Sokolowski
and Corbin), at least in rats, including some social behaviours such
as the display of dominance and reactions to it.
humans share many instinctive behaviours with less evolved animals, some
more advanced social behaviours are unique to humans. Smiling, laughing
and crying, all of which involve the use of complex facial expressions,
are examples. Darwin believed them to be innate behaviours (Darwin,
1872), and extensive research into the behaviour of blind children has
confirmed his suppositions (Ekman).
far, so good, but difficulties emerge when we move on to behaviours involving
multiple individuals, which we may loosely term 'groupish', and many of
which involve moral sentiments such as reciprocity, empathy, altruism,
cooperation and intentionality ('theory of mind'). There
is documented research demonstrating the existence of moral sentiments
in a wide variety of non-human and non-primate animals, including dogs,
elephants, rats and birds (see, e.g. Bekoff and Pierce).
first sight, many of these advanced social behaviours are less obviously
genetically driven than the basic instincts, but at least those most strongly
associated with the group are clearly innate, for instance empathy and
reciprocity. That is not to say that they cannot be deepened or weakened
by life experience, but it is indisputable that they originated as unavoidable
concomitants of group living, and as is clearly demonstrated in Agent
Human (see in particular Chapters 2 and 3), groupish living originated
far back in evolutionary history, as did therefore moral behaviours on
the part of group members.
for example, (and its antithesis, deception) is a complex behaviour, involving
a balancing act between the selfish interests of an individual and those
of a group of individuals (conspecifics). Before we even come to primates,
cooperation has been amply demonstrated between multiple members of numerous
species. The nativist position requires that cooperation will result from
ontogenetic neural development, presumably demanding an innate ability
on the part of an individual to recognize one or more conspecifics (no
training allowed, remember), and a predisposition on the part of the individual
to cooperate with them. Until recently there has been little research
in humans, let alone other animals, that addresses the issue of whether
such a predisposition might arise ontogenetically, or whether it requires
external influences to encourage its formation, which might, for instance,
involve interaction with a parent or siblings (quite easy to believe in
an ontogenetic mechanism to 'imprint' such interactions and transfer them
to more generalized drives), or might require more specific training to
be delivered by a parent.
et al (2007) demonstrated that altruism arises ontogenetically in
chimpanzees as well as in human infants. Their results 'indicate that
chimpanzees share crucial aspects of altruism with humans, suggesting
that the roots of human altruism may go deeper than previous experimental
fMRI study published in 2006 (Völlm et al) investigated
the neural correlates of empathic and Theory of Mind (ToM) activity. Both
types of activity were located in the medial pre-frontal cortex (MPFC),
temporo-parietal Junction (TPJ), and the temporal poles. ToM activity
was additionally located in the lateral orbito-frontal cortex (LOFC),
the middle frontal gyrus (MFG), the cuneus and the superior temporal gyrus
(STG). Empathic activity, on the other hand, was additionally located
in various sections of the cingulate cortex and the amygdala. The authors
conclude that while both types of activity employ regions of the brain
associated with the making of judgments about others, empathy also recruits
parts of the brain involved in emotional processing. They describe different
schools of thought regarding the origins of ToM and empathic faculties:
the 'theory-theory' school, so-called, would attribute such faculties
in large measure to post-natal experience, while the 'simulationist' school
would consider them to be predominantly innate. The authors suggest that
recent research, and particularly the discovery of mirror neurons, together
with their own results, lend more weight to the simulationist school.
(2009) confirmed the prominent role of the MPFC in assembling social event
knowledge, based on its connections to the limbic system, noting that
the MPFC is phylogenetically and ontogenetically more ancient than other
cortical regions such as the lateral PFC which appear in higher primates
and humans and which are the seat of more advanced cognitive capabilities
such as social planning involving a self image interacting with others.
Krueger admits that knowledge about pre-human social brain activity is
primate research has not been particularly helpful in identifying higher-order
social MPFC functions.'
(2011) tested whether the intensity of the neural correlates of empathy
in humans (activity in a number of brain regions including particularly
the medial pre-frontal cortex (MPFC), the dorsomedial pre-frontal cortex
(DMPFC), and the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (subACC) varied according
to the amount of cognitive load being imposed on an individual, finding
that in the MPFC and the DMPFC, although not in the subACC, there was
a reduction in activity intensity for some but not all individuals under
the load condition, although the effect was not great. The researchers
conclude that empathy is not an entirely automatic process, as it is frequently
assumed to be in the literature. The equivalence between automaticity
and a genetic origin is itself questionable, of course. Still, that is
the conventional position. The test relied on self-reporting of felt empathy
alongside fMRI scanning, so that equivalent tests in animals are of course
close to impossible to mount or to interpret.
and other similar studies that locate 'moral sentiments' quite precisely
in the human brain obviously raise the question of whether they can be
found in similar locations in the brains of 'lower' animals that have
similar sentiments. Few researchers approach this question due to the
experimental difficulties, but those that do tend to assert that there
is a degree of similarity between humans and other mammals. Thus, Decetya
and Svetlova (2012):
empathic understanding, which encompasses self/other awareness, is probably
specific to humans, empathic arousal and empathic concern are shared
in common with other primates and mammals. Thus human empathy depends
on ancient systems for intersubjectivity, rooted in attachment to kin
and care for their well-being. However, layered on top of this, the
cognitive abilities that are unique to our species – language,
meta-representation and executive function – interact with more
ancient systems and expand the range of behaviors that can be driven
one needs to be cautious regarding the forms of behaviors in the animal
kingdom that have been interpreted as evidence of empathy and concern,
basic affective states – and the neural mechanisms to support
them – are homologous in all mammals (Panksepp,
1998). The study of comparative neuroanatomy makes clear that behaviors
motivated by emotion arousal evolved earlier than those driven by complex
cognitive capacities. The highly interconnected regions of the brainstem,
basal ganglia, and limbic system antedated expansion of the neocortex.
affective circuits emerged much earlier in brain evolution than higher
cognitive capacities. This enables mammalian species to care for offspring
sufficiently long so that the offspring, too, can reproduce.
animals clearly possess at least one of the essential underlying components
of empathy: the ability to be affected by, and share, the emotional
state of another.
the emergence of an integrated self–other representational system
has occurred relatively recently (during the course of the last 2 million
years of human evolution) and only exists in a handful of species such
as chimpanzees, elephants and bottlenose dolphins, or has evolved along
a continuum so it can be found in different forms in other species is
still a matter of debate (see Gallup, 1985, Lauwereyns
et al., 2010 and Povinelli et al., 2000).'
speaking, the divisions of the modern mammalian brain already existed
300 million years ago when amphibians evolved into sauropsids (reptiles
and birds) and the integrated limbic system dates back another 100 million
years or more to the time of the condricthians (e.g. sharks).
used to be thought that there were major structural differences between
the mammalian and sauropsid brains in terms of the cortex.
It is fairly well accepted by now, however, that the mammalian neocortex
and the equivalent sauropsid (reptile) dorsal cortex and dorsal ventricular
ridge (DVR) developed from a common antecedent, being the pallium,
in the ancestor reptile that evolved from amphibians (eg Reiner,
2000; Husband and Shimizu,
2001). Research has show that functionally and biochemically there is
a lot of similarity between mammalian and sauropsid cortices. See Sanides
(1969) and Deacon (1990).
paragraphs have made out the case for an ontogenetic origin for the moral
sentiments across a range of species, with a degree of experimental basis,
and not needing to distinguish between a 'nativist' or a 'collective'
explanation. But moral sentiments on their own do not account for the
commonality of mythic beliefs and images between human cultures and their
universal role in underpinning aspects of groupish behaviour. A prominent
role is played in this assembly of mythic beliefs and images by archetypes.
Archetypes were described in some depth in Agent Human, particularly in
Appendix Three, and a brief summary of that material is included in Appendix
Three of the current volume.
a word used in this context initially by Jung
(1958) and very much elaborated by his follower Ernest Neumann
(1954) is a numinous (potent, powerful) unconscious psychic content. In
itself it is not to be thought of as having a specific form – it
exists in a very deep layer of the brain – but it gives rise to images
in the visual cortex which partially represent it.
Jung described the collective
unconscious (itself being that part of the unconscious which is common
to all members of a group) as consisting of mythological motives or primordial
images to which he gave the name 'archetypes'. Archetypes are not inborn
ideas, but are:
'typical forms of behaviour,
which, once they become conscious, naturally present themselves as ideas
and images, like everything else that becomes a content of consciousness
. . . When an archetype appears in a dream, in a fantasy or in life,
it always brings with it a certain influence or power by virtue of which
it either exercises a numinous or a fascinating effect, or impels to
it's possible to imagine and even to measure an inbuilt neural mechanism
to support the development of cooperation, empathy, and even ToM, it is
more difficult to do the same for such human archetypal images as the
set of familial relationships including The Mother, The Fathers and The
Hero, to pick just a few from the overall collection of very many human
archetypes, together with the mythic structures that accompany them. However,
it won't do to propose that such psychic content is 'learned' from mothers,
fathers, uncles or witch-doctors; it may be reinforced in such ways, but
only some more fundamental mechanism can explain its appearance in every
child regardless of its circumstances and the culture into which it is
the absence of experimental demonstration of the existence of archetypes,
which runs counter to the current obsession with observation and measurement
of any phenomenon which seeks scientific respectability, you will not
find it easy to turn up out-and-out denials of the existence of archetypes.
On the contrary, you will find many researchers and commentators who readily
accept the reality of the idea of archetypes, and mostly agree that they
are a fundamental feature of human ontology, without however venturing
any guesses at what neural mechanisms may express them.
one example out of many, here is Laughlin (1996):
archetypes as structures mediating intuitive and symbolic knowledge
are undoubtedly located in the areas of the nervous system that appear
to have evolved most dramatically during the course of hominid encephalization
and that produce the distinctly human quality of mentation, learning,
communication, and social action characteristic of our species today.
I am not just attempting to reduce the archetypes to structures in the
brain. However, if I left the analysis at this point, then I would surely
be guilty of doing something that Jung consistently refused to do, for
you will remember that he was also of the opinion that the archetypes
are to be considered as the confluence of spirit and matter.
. . . .
I do agree with Penrose's (1989) arguments against
narrow AI-type computational models of consciousness, it does seem possible
on the strength of parapsychological and ethnographic evidence that
information exchange of a broader kind may be occurring between the
conscious brain and the quantum sea.
hunch is that we may find that there are a number of mechanisms operating
at the sub-cellular level by which the structure of the sea is transduced
into patterned neural activity, and visa versa. So in a sense, we may
speak of neurognosis as mediator of the structure of the quantum universe
and the structure of the individual consciousness.
will not be agreeing that archetypes are that recent – wolves baying
at the moon are presumably obeying an archetypal imperative – but
the extract illustrates a common feature of many contemporary accounts
of archetypal activity, being the existence of some external field which
interacts with or provides the individual's internal psychic archetypal
content. In the case of Laughlin, Jung's 'spirit' is dubbed the 'quantum
sea', and is an example of a popular tendency to treat consciousness as
a quantum phenomenon. This attitude tends towards a dualist position,
although Laughlin himself strongly denies any dualist persuasion.
is unclear to what extent archetypes exist in non-hominid brains. If it
is the case that archetypal cognitive content, including images, is necessary
to the development of groupish feelings and behaviour, then it might follow
that archetypes exist to some degree in all species that display groupish
behaviour. That is an extreme and highly speculative position, of course.
for the moment, that archetypes and their associated psychic content do
exist in the neo-natal human brain, and that they arise ontogenetically,
we still have to explain the mechanism by which they arise. It is easy
to imagine (and demonstrate) a genetic basis for instincts, and relatively
easy to imagine the same for the moral sentiments, but it is much more
of a mental stretch to imagine that archetypes arise in the developing
brain without any kind of external influence. One might say that every
baby has a mother, and that such cognitive content is transmitted in some
way from the mother to the baby. But that begs the question: there still
has to be a mechanism for the transmission. Nativist explanations seem
improbable; there needs to be at least a partly collectivist explanation.
the term 'collective unconscious' is used to encapsulate archetypes and
their associated psychic content, the language is moving closer to admitting
the existence of an external body of content.
Jung himself, nor his follower and in respect of archetypes, successor,
Ernest Neumann, ever took a clear position on whether the collective unconscious
had any existence independently of the individuals in which it operates.
Jung often lamented the absence of relevant research; he died in 1961.
came closest to a statement that archetypes and the collective unconscious
have independent existence through his theory of 'synchronicity', which
was most fully expounded in 'Synchronicity: An Acausal
Connecting Principle', originally published in 1954:
is impossible, with our present resources, to explain ESP, or the fact
of meaningful coincidence, as a phenomenon of energy. This makes an
end of the causal explanation as well, for "effect" cannot
be understood as anything except a phenomenon of energy. Therefore it
cannot be a question of cause and effect, but of a falling together
in time, a kind of simultaneity. Because of this quality of simultaneity,
I have picked on the term "synchronicity" to designate a hypothetical
factor equal in rank to causality as a principle of explanation.'
roots of Jung's theory are to be found in his lifelong fascination with
the paranormal and in his relationships with Albert Einstein and Wolfgang
Pauli, leading him to conflate quantum mechanics, then at a very early
stage of development, with the paranormal and his work on the unconscious.
The result was synchronicity, and what Jung and Pauli called the 'unus
mundus', the interconnectedness of all things.
Erich Neumann vastly elaborated Jung's ideas in a series of books between
1950 and 1980, beginning with The Origins and History
of Consciousness, and later particularly in relation to the feminine
psyche, he does not appear to have written on synchronicity, and did not
make any clear statement regarding the independence or otherwise of the
collective unconscious. He died in 2004,
If ontogeny, expressing itself during individual development, does not
provide satisfactory explanations for the emergence of archetypes, then
we have to look elsewhere, and that is how the 'collectivist' hypothesis
arises. There is little point in appealing to a reader's evidence-based
world-view for an acceptance of the collective unconscious as an existential
reality: there is no evidence; there is just a set of improbabilities
which point one in that direction, supported by the increasingly mainstream
discipline of quantum mechanics and the almost respectable study of psi
(paranormal phenomena). The purpose of this book is to present the evidence
for the involvement of quantum and psi phenomena in the workings of the
human brain, conscious and unconscious, and to try to work towards a synthesis
of current science in that area.
though look to quantum mechanics and psi to account for human psychical
development rather than other possible branches of science, pseudo or
otherwise? In the case of quantum mechanics, it is because there is already
a substantial body of evidence that quantum mechanisms are involved in
neural operations; indeed, many writers, and that is not putting the case
too strongly, propose that consciousness itself is a quantum phenomenon.
The present writer thinks that to be piffle, except in the most trivial
sense; but it is piffle that exists and must be dealt with. In the case
of psi, it is because there is no known physical mechanism that can account
for demonstrated psychic phenomena, including the ability of humans and
animals to communicate with each other at a distance, and it seems impossible
to rule out the possible involvement of such a mechanism in the collective
unconscious, if that exists.
decades, or even, some would say, centuries during which psi (telepathy,
precognition, psychokinesis et al) has been treated as a 'pseudo-science',
unworthy of serious consideration by scientists and researchers steeped
in the mechanistic traditions established by Descartes, the body of rigorously
conducted research into psi phenomena has reached a tipping point, and
with the utmost reluctance on the part of academia the discipline has
been accepted into the pantheon of respectable sciences. Just! There are
still plenty of sceptics who are unwilling or unable to see or accept
the plain truth that psi exists.
sudden respectability of psi has taken place in parallel with the growing
realization on the part of scientists that quantum mechanics has completely
upended the classical model of physical dynamics. That model had been
seen as severely compromised by Heisenberg, Planck and Einstein, with
the coup de grace being administered by Scots/Irish physicist John Stewart
Bell in the 1960s. Bell's Theorem, which holds that 'entangled' particles
are instantaneously interconnected however far apart they may be, and
that it is impossible to measure both the momentum and the spin of such
a particle, has been experimentally verified time and again.
mechanics has profound consequences for the science of biology and evolution.
It is a startling but undisputed fact that when a cell divides, it gives
off a photon, and that the two resulting cells are quantum entangled.
The consequence would seem to be that all cells and therefore all assemblies
of cells (we may call them animals, or brains, for instance) are quantum
entangled, and always were, because it seems unlikely that quantum mechanics
or quantum entanglement somehow came into existence after life emerged
then that all organic particles, cells we may call them, are interconnected,
it is but a short step to asserting that quantum phenomena are likely
to be implicated in the processes of evolution, and beyond that in the
techniques of communication between organisms of the same or different
species, including by all means the existence of a collective unconscious.
work on quantum theory has sketched out the possibility that quantum interconnectness,
far from being just a phenomenon that exists in an uneasy relationship
with classical mechanics, is integral to the construction of space-time
and the concepts of Einsteinian relativity, see Raamsdonk
supplement to Agent Human will explore the territory sketched out above,
and will attempt to put forward a account of how quantum interconnectedness
has impacted the process of evolution, and not incidentally has enabled
the formation of the collective unconscious and the techniques of psi.
Marc, and Pierce, Jennifer, (2009) Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of
Animals, University of Chicago Press
Michael G, (2010) Agent Human: Consciousness At The Service Of The
Group, Future Global Technology Publishing Group, and at www.agenthuman.com
C R, (1872) The expression of the emotions in man and animals,
London, John Murray
T W (1990) Rethinking Mammalian Brain Evolution, American Zoologist,
30, pp 629-705
Jean, and Svetlova, Margarita, (2012) Putting together phylogenetic
and ontogenetic perspectives on empathy, Developmental Cognitive
Neuroscience Volume 2, Issue 1, January 2012, pp 1–24
Paul, (1973) Darwin and Facial Expression, Academic Press
Gordon G, Jr, (1985) Do minds exist in species other than our own?
& Biobehavioral Reviews Volume 9, Issue 4, Winter 1985, pp 631–641
S A and Shimizu, T (2001) Evolution of the Avian Visual System,
in Avian Visual Cognition, ed. Cook, R, www.pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/avc/husband/default.htm
Carl G (1973), Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle,
Princeton University Press, 1973; first published in German in 1952
Carl G (1958) The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, Princeton
University Press, USA
Frank, Barbey, Aron K, and Grafman, Jordan (2009) The medial prefrontal
cortex mediates social event knowledge, Cognitive Neuroscience Section,
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes
of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, at http://decisionneurosciencelab.org/pdfs/Krueger%20et%20al%20(2009).pdf,
accessed on June 23, 2015
Charles D (1996) Archetypes, Neurognosis and the Quantum Sea,
Journal of Scientific Exploration 10, pp 375-400, at www.biogeneticstructuralism.com/docs/archetyp_sse.rtf,
accessed on June 24, 2015
Jan (ed.), Rajala A Z, Reininger K R, Lancaster K M, and Populin L C (2010)
Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) Do Recognize Themselves in the Mirror:
Implications for the Evolution of Self-Recognition, PLoS ONE 5(9):
E (1954) The Origins and History of Consciousness, tr R F C Hull,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, UK (originally published in German in 1949)
Jaak, (2010) Affective neuroscience of the emotional BrainMind: evolutionary
perspectives and implications for understanding depression, Dialogues
Clin Neurosci. 2010 Dec; 12(4): pp 533–545
Roger, (1989) The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds
and The Laws of Physics, Oxford University Press
Susan, (2008) The Neural Regulation of Thirst, Society for Neuroscience,
accessed on June 21, 2015
D J, Bering, J M and Giambrone, S, (2000) Toward a science of other
minds: escaping the argument by analogy, Cognitive Science 24, pp
M van (2010) Building Up Spacetime With Quantum Entanglement,
Essay Awarded By The Gravity Research Foundation,
General Relativity and Gravitation October 2010, Volume 42, Issue 10,
pp 2323-2329, First online: 19 June 2010
Lian T, Morelli, Sylvia A and Lieberman, Matthew D, (2011) The Neural
Correlates of Empathy: Experience, Automaticity, and Prosocial Behavior,
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 08/2011; 24(1): pp 235-45, at http://stanford.edu/~smorelli/Sylvia_Morelli_files/Rameson_2012_JOCN.pdf,
accessed on June 21, 2015
A J (2000) A Hypothesis as to the Organization of Cerebral Cortex
in the Common Amniote Ancestor of Modern Reptiles and Mammals, Evolutionary
Developmental Biology of the Cerebral Cortex, No. 228, Novartis Foundation
F (1969) Comparative Architectonics of the Neocortex of Mammals and
Their Evolutionary Interpretation, Annals of the New York Academy
of Sciences, 167, pp 404-423
Katie, and Corbin, Joshua G, (2012) Wired for behaviors: from development
to function of innate limbic system circuitry, Front Mol Neurosci.
2012; 5: 55, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3337482/,
accessed on June 21, 2015
Birgit A, Taylor, Alexander N W, Richardson, Paul, Corcoran, Rhiannon,
et al (2006) Neuronal correlates of theory of mind and empathy: a functional
magnetic resonance imaging study in a nonverbal task, Neuroimage, February
2006, at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/7637630_Neuronal_correlates_of_theory_of_mind_and_empathy_
on June 22, 2015
F, Hare, B, Melis, A P, Hanus, D and Tomasello, M, (2007) Spontaneous
Altruism by Chimpanzees and Young Children, PLoS Biol 5(7): e184,
accessed on June 23, 2015